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05. PEASANTRIES 
 
by Eric Vanhaute, Hanne Cottyn & Yang Wang 
 
 
Research questions and research strategy 
 
A comparative and global analysis of the position of 
peasant societies within the expanding capitalist world-system 
from 1500 to 2000 must address three different but 
interrelated global questions: de-agrarianization, de-
ruralization, and de-peasantization
1
. We try to understand the 
different roads of transition via a comparative research 
design, looking for similar and divergent trajectories of 
peasant transformation, both in space (zoning within the 
world-economy) and over time (phases of incorporation). We do 
this by focusing on three cases: Northwestern Europe (North 
Sea Basin), the East coast of China (Yangzi River Delta), and 
Latin America (Central Andean Highlands). They are analyzed 
via four successive snapshots: circa 1600, 1800, 1900, and 
2000.  
The choice of the three regions reflects the zoned 
division within the modern world-system: 
- North Sea Basin (England and the Low Countries): a 
predominantly core region from the late Middle Ages onwards 
within the (western European) interstate system and the 
capitalist world-economy (incorporation through core-making 
processes); 
- Central Andean Highlands (southern contemporary Peru and the 
western areas of Bolivia): from the core of an Andean world-
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 Our analysis is based on a larger project “The end of peasant 
societies? A comparative and global research into the decline and 
disappearance of peasantries and its impact on social relations and 
inequality, 1500-2000”, a research project coordinated by Eric 
Vanhaute and funded by the Flemish National Science Foundation. The 
project is summarized in Vanhaute (2008) and Vanhaute (2011). Our 
analysis here sketches the general outline of the project.  
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system (Inca empire) to an incorporated and increasingly 
peripheralized region within the modern world-system since the 
sixteenth century (incorporation through periphery-making 
processes); 
- the east coast of China (Yangzi River Delta): from being a 
core region in the East Asian world-system to becoming 
primarily a peripheral (late nineteenth century) and then a 
semiperipheral (late twentieth century) zone within the modern 
world-system (incorporation by inheritance). 
Three interlocked dimensions constitute the trajectories 
of transformation of these rural zones: a) the 
(re)constitution of the peasant societies - household 
organization, village systems, regional networks; b) the 
relations of these rural zones to broader societal structures 
- trade and commerce networks, fiscal systems, power and 
property relations; c) the transformation of these societies 
and the effects on their social relations, survival, and 
income levels. To understand the interaction between these 
three dimensions, we analyzed three interlocked research 
themes: political and economic organization and social power 
relations; regulation of and access to labor, land, and 
natural resources; household and village strategies. 
An integrated analysis of these themes allows us to 
address the following questions: What were the trajectories of 
incorporation of rural zones into the capitalist world-system? 
How did this incorporation affect the spaces and edges of 
peasant subsistence systems? Did and do these processes of 
peasant transformation create a more homogeneous world, or do 
they feed new trends of heterogenization?  
 
 
 
Hypotheses and definitions 
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Historical capitalism has been at the heart of the 
permanent (re)creation and marginalization of peasant 
societies. We define peasants as members of rural, agrarian 
households who have direct access to land and natural 
resources. They are organized in family groups and village 
communities that meet a large part of their subsistence needs 
(production, exchange, credit, protection), and they pool 
different forms of income from land, labor, and exchange. They 
are ruled by other social groups that extract a surplus either 
via rents, via (unbalanced) market transfers, or through 
control of state power (taxation). The key analytic issues are 
the degree of household and local autonomy, the flexible 
strategies of income-pooling, the household-based village 
structures, and the surplus extraction that is outside local 
control.  
The long-term decline of the centrality of rural zones has 
been framed within three interrelated concepts: de-
ruralization, de-agrarianization, and de-peasantization. De-
ruralization refers to the decline of rural spaces and the 
growth of “urbanized” zones. De-agrarianization refers to the 
decline of reliance on agriculture as the principal source of 
livelihood. De-peasantization refers to the erosion of the 
family basis of their livelihoods and the commodification of 
subsistence (see inter alia Bryceson 1999, Johnson 2004, 
Bernstein 2010, and Vanhaute 2011).  
The common use of de-peasantization as a unilinear vector 
of modernization is misleading, ignoring the diversified 
effects of capitalist expansion on rural societies. 
Peasantries as a social group are a dynamic social process in 
themselves. They are “the historical outcome of an agrarian 
labor process which is constantly adjusting to surrounding 
conditions, be it fluctuations of climate, markets, state 
exactions, political regimes, as well as technical 
innovations, demographic trends, and environmental changes” 
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(Bryceson et al. 2000: 2–3). This implies that processes of 
de-peasantization and re-peasantization are the outcome of 
changing strategies of peasant livelihood diversification. As 
Van der Ploeg has argued, the re-emergence of twenty-first 
century peasantries follows the same historical patterns of 
survival (“self-provisioning”) and autonomy (“distantiation”), 
albeit in different societal settings: “Today’s peasantries 
are actively responding to the processes that otherwise would 
destroy, by-pass and/or entrap them” (van der Ploeg, 2010: 2, 
21).  
The long-term process of capitalist expansion has both 
widened (expansion) and deepened (intensification) relations 
of commodification. Commodification refers to the 
commercialization of goods, sold to or bought from external 
markets. However, the central tendency of capitalism towards 
generalized commodity production does not mean that all 
elements of social existence are necessarily and 
comprehensively commodified (Bernstein 2010). Over time, 
uneven incorporation has been creating new frontier zones, in 
which the commodification of subsistence goods is followed by 
an increasing social and spatial differentiation. 
The gradual incorporation of vast rural zones has 
subjugated, transformed, and sometimes (re)created 
peasantries. It has put increasing pressure on their bases of 
existence through the alteration of peasant access to the 
essential means of production - land, labor, and capital. In 
general, the survival margins of the former majority of small-
scale, diversified, community-based agricultural systems have 
significantly decreased.  
However, we cannot understand the position of the rural 
zones in the modern world-system in a singular manner. 
Peasantries over the world have followed different 
trajectories of change and have developed divergent 
repertoires of adaptation and resistance. Throughout its 
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history the expansion of the capitalist world-system has been 
fueled by the creation of new social and ecological frontier 
zones, spaces that generated new sources of cheap land, labor, 
and natural resources (Hall 2000, Moore 2010). 
Peasantries have always been a vital frontier zone. The 
process of incorporation created flows of surplus extraction, 
without necessarily dispossessing rural producers of their 
land and other means of production. These dynamic zones of 
uneven commodification led to new forms of struggle and 
resistance. That is why trends of homogenization on a macro 
level can generate new forms of heterogenization on the micro 
level. The expansion of the global division of labor triggered 
different paths of de-peasantization and re-peasantization. 
These differences are a consequence of different balances 
between internal dynamics (processes of internal change) and 
external pressure (changes caused by actors outside local 
society), and/or between peasant modes of extraction 
(exploiting family labor) versus capitalist production modes 
(creating capitalist labor relations) (McMichael 2009).  
The three cases illustrate the three basic models of the 
transformation of peasantries in the last five centuries: as 
internal frontier zones in the core of the modern world-system 
(incorporation through core-making processes), as newly 
incorporated frontier zones in the periphery of the modern 
world-system (incorporation through periphery-making 
processes), and as external zones to the modern world-system 
(incorporation by inheritance). In the North Sea region the 
expansion of zones of capitalist agriculture initiated strong 
processes of regional and social differentiation. The violent 
incorporation of the Andean peoples created new intra-regional 
and inter-regional relationships as part of a process of 
peripheralization. In the highly commercialized Yangzi River 
Delta, the trend of growing differentiation was slowed down by 
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the persistence of both a redistributive state system and 
kinship and clan networks. 
 
Sixteenth century: regional incorporations 
 
The sixteenth century marked the beginning of fundamental 
divergences in the development paths. On the eve of the 
sixteenth century we find a polycentric world with thriving 
agrarian civilizations all around the world - from East Asia, 
India, the Middle East and Europe to West Africa and Central 
and South America (Marks 2007). Most of these regional world-
systems were interconnected in supra-regional networks. For 
thousands of years all these regions were characterized by 
cyclical changes in climate and population, linked to long-
term transformations in political and social organization, 
economic production, and living standards.  
This “biological ancien régime” was organic. It depended 
on solar energy to grow crops and on wood for fuel. Overall 
progress was limited due to the physical constraints on such 
solar energy-based agrarian societies. That is why agrarian 
systems all over the world lived at more or less the same 
level. This world of about 450 million people was an 
overwhelmingly rural one, in which 80-90% of the population 
lived as peasants. Nearly all of them were located in a 
handful of civilizations occupying only a small proportion of 
the earth’s surface. These civilizations or empires, and above 
all the ruling elites, survived on the extraction of surpluses 
from those who worked the land, mostly via rents to landowners 
and taxes to the states.  
Three of the most important regional systems were the 
(western) European interstate-system, the Inca empire, and the 
Chinese empire. On the eve of the sixteenth century, the core 
areas in these regional systems (North Sea Basin, Central 
Andean Highlands, and Yangzi River Delta) were all expanding 
economically and demographically, and increasing their supra-
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regional interconnectedness. In all three regions, regional 
autonomy was combined with a continuing integration in broader 
commercial networks. They were developing complex societies, 
with elaborate city-networks, advanced levels of intensive 
agriculture, and expanding exchange networks.  
In the North Sea Basin this expansion was related to 
accelerated processes of market integration and state 
formation (Dyer 2005, Hoppenbrouwers & Van Zanden 2001, Thoen 
2001, Van Bavel 2010, Van Bavel & Hoyle 2010, Vanhaute et al. 
2011). Historically, England and the Low Countries constituted 
the core area of the North Sea Basin. From the twelfth to 
thirteenth centuries onwards they formed the central area of 
structural transformations in the economy (commercialization), 
demography (urbanization), and politics (state-building). 
These regions were comparatively densely populated and highly 
urbanized. They had a strongly commercialized agriculture, a 
growing interregional and intercontinental trade system, and 
intensive industrial production. The transformation in the 
rural societies generated strong regional differentiation. 
Zones with capitalist agriculture, dominated by commercial 
farms and wage labor, developed in the regions bordering the 
North Sea. These zones were bounded by two types of peasant 
societies. The first combined small-scale family farming with 
an expanding proto-industry, thus creating a commercial 
subsistence economy. More distant, but still integrated in a 
regional division of labor, we find more autarchic peasant 
zones with a significant labor surplus.    
At the time the Spanish conquistadores arrived, the 
(relatively) densely populated highlands and intermountain 
valleys of the Central Andes constituted the core region of an 
expanding Inca world-empire. In response to altitudinal 
zoning, a system of direct (diffusion of colonists) and 
indirect (long-distance trade) “vertical ecological control” 
and community-based reciprocal traits, rather than markets, 
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structured the access of communities to complementary 
resources (Larson, Harris & Tandeter, ed. 1995; Lehmann, ed. 
1982; Masuda et al, eds. 1985; Mayer 2002; Murra 1975; Hirth & 
Pillsbury 2013). Highly reliant on previous developments, the 
Incas managed to unify this patchy landscape around a central 
bureaucracy and a redistributive division of goods and labor 
(Andrien 2001, Collier, Rosaldo & Wirth 1982). In the 
sixteenth century the region was incorporated as a peripheral 
zone in the new European-Atlantic system. This incorporation 
into the capitalist world-economy and the accompanying 
Columbian exchange led to a new regional and sectorial 
differentiation. Serving as the economic backbone of the 
Spanish metropolis, the mines of Potosí gave rise to a network 
of regional markets and trade circuits that linked local 
communities to a silver export economy (Larson, Harris &, 
Tandeter 1995, Assadourian 1982, Garavaglia 1983, Glave 1986). 
In response to the drastic decline of the native population 
and in order to facilitate efficient evangelization and labor 
and tribute extraction, the scattered kin-based ethnic groups 
were concentrated into Spanish-style villages under local 
control and cut off from their outlying lands. Local peasant 
production modes shifted substantially as labor was absorbed 
by agro-exporting estates (hacienda system) and obligatory 
service in the mines (mita system) (Aylwin 2002; Bakewell 
19854; Carmagnani 1999, Hoberman & Socolow 1996). Although the 
shift from an auto-sufficient society marked by reciprocity 
and redistribution into a tributary and mercantile society 
deeply affected rural Andean life, the integration of the 
countryside was a process of dynamic encounters rather than of 
unidirectional imposition.   
Since the beginning of the second millennium the Yangzi 
River Delta has been one of the most developed and densely 
populated regions in East Asia, becoming the agricultural and 
industrial center in China (Shiba 2000, Fan 2008). For this 
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region, the final phase of the Ming Dynasty in the sixteenth 
century was a period of economic and commercial growth based 
on a well-integrated commodity economy with high land 
productivity, cash crops, and livestock farming (Liang 1980, 
Li 1998, Pomeranz 2000, Fan 2005). Cities grew and rural 
industries flourished. Regional differences were caused by 
ecological factors (plains, mountains) and reflected a 
differentiated agricultural output (grains, rice, cotton, 
mulberry) (Feng 2002). The international trade network, 
lubricated by silver imported from Japan and the Americas, 
increased inland commerce and led to a diversified industrial 
production around Taihu Lake, the Grand Canal, and the Yangzi 
River (Atwell 1982, Qian & Zheng 1998).  
As in most rural societies, families in these regions were 
organized in small households, knit together in 
kinship/clan/village systems. These rural and peasant families 
pooled the fruits of their land with income from a wide range 
of labor activities. Village communities acted predominantly 
as informal exchange and credit networks. In the North Sea 
Basin a growing part of this income came from commodified 
labor, either in the form of proto-industrial activities or as 
wage labor outside the farm and village (including migrant 
labor). The integration in broader economic systems put local 
exchange networks under growing constraints, resulting in more 
unequal economic and power relations. Along with a gradual 
decrease of the commons, land rights became more 
individualistic (family-based). Proletarianization promoted 
polarization, with the concentration of village power and the 
control over village institutions such as poor relief in the 
hands of land-based oligarchies. 
The growth of a flexible and extra-village labor market 
was much more limited in the Inca and Chinese world-empires. 
In the Andes, the import of the Spanish village system after 
the Conquista cut through inter-ecological and intra-community 
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solidarity systems. Although increasingly under pressure, 
communitarian support systems still relied primarily on pre-
colonial mechanisms in the hands of rotating village 
leadership. Clan loyalties remained strong in the Yangzi River 
Delta. In periods of social unrest they replaced failing state 
engagements (Huang 1990, Fuma 2005, Li & Jiang 2000).  
In the sixteenth century rural zones in all three areas 
were subject to new processes of political and economic 
incorporation, albeit of fundamentally different types. In the 
North Sea Region the direct impact of (internal) integration 
in an expanding inter-state and capitalist system resulted in 
the growing commodification of land, labor, and capital. This 
accelerated a process of regional and social differentiation. 
These regional zones and social groups with different 
production and labor regimes were interconnected through 
unequal power relations. The North Sea Basin is a typical 
example of transformation via the formation of new internal 
frontiers, frontiers that fed the expanding capitalist world-
system. In the Andes, the (external) process of incorporation 
was much more sudden and violent. Processes of commodification 
were inserted into a village and kin-based rural society. This 
was accompanied by a regional reorganization of the rural 
economies, which created a new, external frontier zone. In 
both western Europe and the Andes, new flows of commodities, 
capital, and labor reorganized the rural zones with new 
spatial and social boundaries. The Yangzi River Delta 
encountered successive processes ofincreasing and decreasing 
political incorporation within the context of the Chinese 
world-empire. The sixteenth century was marked by processes of 
agricultural and commercial expansion in combination with the 
dissolution of Ming state structures and a strengthening of 
local clan systems (Hillman 2004). Structural transformations 
remained limited. 
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1800: Global incorporation 
 
In the three centuries after 1500, world population 
doubled and tensions between peasant producers and ruling 
elites increased. Shifting power relations sharpened regional 
differentiation. In general, peasants became more subordinate 
to landlords and/or the growing power of governments (Tauger 
2011). This coincided with an unprecedented expansion of long-
distance markets, creating a remarkable differentiation in 
labor relations - from tributary labor (slavery and indentured 
labor) to different forms of commodified labor from 
sharecropping to self-employed market production (Van der 
Linden 2008). In Europe, increasing pressures of 
commodification spurred social differentiation in peasant 
societies. In the Americas, Western explorers, rulers, and 
investors created a strongly polarized “plantation complex.” 
Chinese Manchurian rulers tried to soften tensions by 
protecting peasant rights (Goldstone 2009).  
In the North Sea Basin agrarian capitalism was firmly 
established by the early nineteenth century (Allen 2009, 
Hoppenbrouwers & Van Zanden 2001, Overton 1996, Van Bavel & 
Hoyle 2010, Vanhaute et al. 2011). The combination of labor-
employing capitalist farmers and wage laborers was widespread 
in much of England and in some parts of the European 
continent. In other regions, peasant market-economies based on 
household farm work and proto-industrial activities remained 
predominant. They were based on local credit networks that 
linked the logic of subsistence farming with the logic of 
external market production. The economic transformations 
accompanying industrialization resulted in a massive 
contraction in the proportion of the workforce employed in 
agriculture, and in a sharp rise in agricultural labor 
productivity. Around 1800, one agricultural laborer in England 
and the Low Countries produced enough to support two workers 
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in manufacturing and services. In the nineteenth century the 
share of non-agricultural population rose to 60-65%, followed 
by rapid urbanization. 
This process of de-agrarianization started in the areas 
around the maritime ports of the North Sea Area and, from 1800 
onwards, followed the spread of industrialization. By the 
early nineteenth century, population pressure and economic 
transformations increasingly affected the fundamentals of the 
rural economy in western Europe (subsistence farming, commons, 
village autonomy). This coincided with a deepening social 
polarization. After 1800, ever larger portions of the rural 
population could secure their survival only via a deeper 
exploitation of family labor on small pieces of land, in old 
and new putting-out industries (such as the clothing and lace 
industries), and by seasonal agricultural and industrial 
activities.  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Central 
Andean region experienced sharp processes of 
peripheralization. Since the sixteenth century the silver 
economy organized around Potosí was the centerpiece of the 
peripheral connection of the Central Andes to core zones and 
the main shaping force of the Andean peasant (socio-
ecological) space (Bonilla 2007: 108, Moore 2011; Tandeter 
1995). Colonial reforms initiated a major reconfiguration of 
the Central Andean rural space towards an incomplete and 
uneven model of capitalist organization. Peasants were 
subjected to tribute payments in money, species, and labor, 
and to evangelization. Indigenous tribute and labor extraction 
eroded the village community, instigating market participation 
and shaping the space for new community survival systems 
(Larson, Harris & Tandeter 1995). In late colonial times, 
peasant economies faced increasing levels of surplus 
extraction by an interventionist Bourbon state, a system of 
coerced commodity commerce (reparto de mercancias) and ethnic 
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authorities (kurakas), erupting in the great Andean rebellions 
of 1780-81 (Andrien 2001, Garrido 2001, Golte 1980, Stern 
1987, Stavig & Schmidt 2008). Indigenous groups were gradually 
pushed to the margins of the markets to which they had adapted 
as traders and transporters, initiating a long transition 
phase until the second half of the nineteenth century (Larson 
1995, 1998; Langer 2004). From the 1780s on, the declining 
silver economy and the chaotic transition to independence 
shifted further the position of the Central Andes, which 
became a periphery of the periphery. State revenues would 
continue to depend almost exclusively on indigenous 
contributions until the export boom of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, indirectly contributing to a ruralization 
of Andean national economies (Langer 2004, Larson 2004, Platt 
1982). 
During the Ming Dynasty the peasants in the Yangzi River 
Delta strongly increased agricultural outputs by reclaiming 
new land, planting new crops, and adapting labor-intensive 
techniques (Huang 1990, Pomeranz 2000). After 1644, Manchu 
rulers promoted a massive change in class structure and power 
relations, followed by rapid economic and demographic growth 
(Ho 2000, Gao 2005, Goldstone 2009). Many peasants acquired 
property rights, strengthening Qing autocratic rule. This 
agricultural and demographic expansion increased pressure on 
the use of public goods, such as water and commons management, 
market infrastructure, public relief, social safety, and 
education. The local clan elites played an important role in 
safeguarding village credit networks, in preserving the 
environment, and in land redistribution. This did not prevent 
the decay of rural institutions in the nineteenth century, 
leading to peasant bankruptcies and to the dismantlement of 
village communities. The local gentry left for the cities and 
rural common interests were neglected (Qian & Zheng 1998).This 
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implosion of Chinese peasant societies preceded the process of 
the incomplete incorporation and peripheralization of China.  
 
1900: Imperialist intensification 
 
As of 1900 only about 15% of the world’s population were 
living in urban areas. Twelve cities had more than one million 
inhabitants. By 1950 the ratio of urban population has doubled 
to 30% and the number of cities with over one million people 
had grown to 83. This overall trend is the outcome of 
divergent paths of transformation. From the 1870’s, a “first 
global food regime” based on a settler-colonial model created 
a new global division of agricultural labor (McMichael 2009). 
The colonial/imperialist project implied control over labor in 
the rural zones in the global South. This required a direct 
intervention in the rural institutions and practices of land 
allocation and use, sometimes destroying them, sometimes 
modifying them. Rural regions specialized either in grain and 
meat production (extra-European settler economies), or in 
tropical export crops (colonial Asia and Africa, and former 
colonies in Latin America), both via plantations and via 
forced peasant production. 
This imposed the commodification of peasant and settler 
farming and facilitated the creation of industrial 
plantations. In Latin America’s process of brutal 
peripheralization, peasantries adapted to encroaching 
processes of commodification, while in China the implosion of 
rural societies foreshadowed the painful process of an 
indirect incorporation. In the western European core, peasant 
societies crumbled and were absorbed by “modernized” economic 
and political structures.  
By the 1870s markets in the North Sea Region were 
liberalized. Large-scale grain and food imports provoked a 
fall in market prices, and the number of farmers started to 
15 
 
decline (Overton 1996, Van Bavel & Hoyle 2010, Vanhaute et al. 
2011). Surviving family farms were reoriented towards 
commercial crops and raising livestock. In these farming 
households, family labor was more and more restricted to the 
nuclear household, gradually excluding all forms of labor 
exchange with other family and non-family relations. Ever more 
inputs came from outside the farm and the village, making 
farmers more dependent on external factors. New types of 
farmers’ organizations succeeded in filling the gap, via 
cooperatives for the purchase of fertilizers and livestock 
feed, savings and loan cooperatives, cooperative dairy farms, 
and mutual insurances. 
 The farmers unions presented themselves as the political 
representatives of the farmers, and efficiently supported 
their members through the process of modernization. Non-
agricultural alternatives, such as sub-contracting production, 
commuting, and new industrial activities relieved the growing 
tension between labor and income. Expelled surplus labor could 
largely be absorbed by urban and rural industrialization and 
by the new service sectors. Rural society separated into a 
smaller fraction of market-oriented specialized family farmers 
and a growing number of households pooling their own farm 
income with outside agriculture and other employment outside 
the village economy. Villages in these regions suburbanized, 
becoming part of bigger systems of employment, transport, and 
provisioning. Regional differences were gradually blotted out 
in favor of a much more uniform “sub-rural/sub-urban” society. 
In the longer run, the fact that the majority of rural 
households broke their ties with agriculture paved the way to 
a continuous rise in economic welfare in twentieth-century 
western Europe. 
In the post-independence Andean Highlands, colonial power 
relations were reproduced at the local level by new rural 
provincial elites, at the national level by oligarchic and new 
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capitalist elites basing their power on land and mining, and 
at the international level by foreign capitalist 
entrepreneurs. The attempts to create a land market and 
convert indigenous commoners into a smallholder class in the 
late nineteenth century, however largely frustrated, 
substantially altered Amerindian-State (tributary) relations 
and heightened rural unrest (Jackson 1997, Larson 2004, Mallon 
1995, Platt 1982, Stern 1987, Yepez del Castillo 1972, Thurner 
1997). Liberal reforms and the shift to free trade policies 
went accompanied by pressures towards the enclosure, 
displacement, and absorption of rural communities by the world 
market and its local agents (Larson 2004). However, the 
indigenous community was able to negotiate, escape and resist 
these commodification projects rather than yielding to one-
sided incorporation or isolation (Baud 2009, Grieshaber 1980, 
Jacobsen 1993, Klein 1993, Langer 1989, Mallon 1983, Moreno & 
Salomon 1991, Platt 1984, Rivera 1987).  
After the 1840s, the process of indirect incorporation 
confined China to a peripheral position in the capitalist 
world-economy. Agricultural and industrial performance 
deteriorated in the Yangzi River Delta. In the early twentieth 
century, a new wave of innovation launched the modernization 
of China's agriculture. A cooperative rural reconstruction 
movement filled the gap left by failing state power. This 
could not stop rising social vulnerability and polarization 
(Wang 2003). The rural areas were not able to absorb the 
growing supply of labor. Social differences in the villages 
increased, and a rural exodus loosened community ties.  
 
2000: Neo-liberal intensification 
 
In 2000 almost half of the earth’s population resided in 
urbanized settings. Only 42% still lived predominantly from 
agricultural labor. One is tempted to see this as a central 
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vector of convergence in the contemporary world, incorporated 
in a single capitalist world-system. However, beneath the 
overall trend of contraction of rural/peasant zones, one 
discerns striking regional differences. Between 1950 and 2000 
the disparity in agricultural population ratios between 
“highest income” and “lowest income” countries increased from 
circa 1-4 in 1960 (19% and 78%) to circa 1-20 in 2000 (3% and 
59%). This went along with opposite trends in land/labor 
intensity. While in the global North the long-term trend was 
one of labor saving, in the global South more agricultural 
workers were employed per unit of farmland in 2000 than in 
1950. These divergences are part of a shared experience of a 
more global and more entangled corporate food regime, 
shrinking the margins for peasant and family farming. While 
peasant farming in the global North virtually disappeared, in 
the global South large parts of rural and urban populations 
clinged to small-scale agricultural production. Neoliberal 
globalization included a shift towards a corporate regulation 
of the global food economy, with an increasing concentration 
of global firms in both agri-input and agri-food industries, 
and an ongoing and deepening commodification of peasant 
subsistence in the global South.  
In the North Sea Region, the development of a European 
agricultural policy in the 1950s sealed the breakthrough of a 
highly commercialized, industrialized, and interconnected 
agricultural sector (Van Bavel & Hoyle 2010, Vanhaute et al. 
2011). The remaining small farmers were pushed out, except for 
those who switched to producing high-value, capital-intensive 
crops and livestock. Labor was replaced by machinery. 
Increasing farm sizes required farmers to have more capital 
resources at their disposal.  
While in Europe farmers as a social group disappeared from 
the social radar at both village and national levels, in the 
Andes the socioeconomic and political emancipation of 
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indigenous peasants gained major impetus (Stern 1987, Larson 
2004, Gotkowitz 2007). Peasant mobilization was triggered by 
servile labor relations, extreme land concentration, and 
syndical organization around the middle of the twentieth 
century. Land and constitutional reforms enhanced formal and 
individualizing land and civil rights, but failed to halt land 
fragmentation, extreme poverty, and marginalization, and 
generally favored capitalist production (Kay 1998, Mayer et 
al. 2009 for Peru; Urioste et al. 2007 for Bolivia). Although 
the majority of the Andean population still lived in 
indigenous peasant communities in the Altiplano and valleys, 
demographic pressures in combination with large-scale mining 
and small-scale agriculture prohibited further expansion of 
the agricultural frontier. This led to de-ruralization, 
intra/inter community conflicts, and massive migration towards 
the lowlands, coastal and urban areas, and abroad. 
Environmental degradation, climate change, and migration were 
changing the face of the Andean countryside. There was a 
widening socio-economic gap, particularly between the rural 
and the urban zones. Social conflicts marked the enduring 
processes of peripheralization.  
After 1950 the Communist state apparatus in China tried to 
speed up the processes of de-ruralization and de-
peasantization in the Yangzi River Delta (MacFarquhar 1997). 
The household-based peasant system was replaced by a 
collective production system. Landlords were eliminated after 
a process of mass collectivization. Through highly centralized 
social institutions, the rural cadres of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) controlled social and economic resources, which 
greatly strengthened the state's social mobilization capacity. 
After the 1980s, peasants gradually privatized land use rights 
in practice, and an agricultural marketing system was 
gradually rebuilt (Carter et al. 1996). The people’s communes 
were replaced by a “town-level government plus village-
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autonomy.” However, social and economic stress on the rural 
society increased heavily during the last decades of the 
twentieth century. Local governments were trying to raise 
land-based revenues by enlarging farms and increasing 
mechanization. Massive migration flowing from villages to 
cities fuelled the most radical process of de-ruralization up 
to then. The imbalanced rural/urban growth fundamentally 
undermined the basis of social order in rural areas, 
increasing social inequality and social protest. 
 
Trajectories of peasant transformation: distinct stories in a 
single narrative 
 
The incorporation of rural zones in the capitalist world-
economy has thoroughly redefined and recreated the spaces and 
boundaries of peasant survival systems. The decline of both 
its agrarian organization as its family and village basis has 
fundamentally altered the strategies of livelihood 
diversification. The uneven nature of the processes of 
incorporation and commodification has fuelled divergent 
trajectories of peasant transformation and created new social 
and ecological frontier zones. All world regions encountered 
between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries new and more 
intensive forms of social and geographical polarization, 
albeit in strongly different manners. The breakthrough of 
commercial and agricultural capitalism in the North Sea Area 
and of a trans-Atlantic trade system in the long sixteenth 
century thoroughly reconfigured peasant zones in both core and 
peripheries. Inequality increased, within and between regions. 
Core processes of incorporation in western Europe could 
eventually absorb the impact of uneven economic and social 
growth. Peasant zones differentiated into a small fraction of 
commercial farmers and a large non-agricultural labor force. 
Peripheral processes of incorporation, such as in the Andean 
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Highlands, had a disastrous impact on the regional rural 
systems, brutally redirecting them towards the needs of the 
metropolis. This process was not at all unilinear or equal. 
Although it gradually weakened the capacity of peasant 
livelihood diversification, it also created new spaces of 
interaction, survival and resistance. 
The long-term transformation of peasant communities in the 
Yangzi River Delta was rooted in the gradual decline of the 
inclusive and protective policies of the Chinese empires. This 
process was amplified by the indirect, unequal incorporation 
of China. This triggered new forms of social tension, to which 
the new republican and communist states responded 
inadequately. The rural-urban gap has become a crucial 
determinant in the fast growing inequality in  China. 
The “long twentieth century” corporate food regime 
globalized through waves of imperialist and neo-liberal 
intensification the North Sea geo-model of a core of capital 
intensive market production with peasant-based export cum 
survival zones at the edges. This restructuring and 
intensification of core-periphery relations created new 
divergences both in the rural economy as in peasant societies. 
The disappearance of peasantries in Europe, the 
reconfiguration of rural societies in China, and the struggle 
to formulate new peasant responses to peripheral positions in 
Latin America are all part of the changing global geo-system 
of the early twenty-first century. This has greatly 
strengthened global inequality. 
Contrary to the (semi-)urbanized labor force in the global 
North, the rural workers of the global South have to pursue 
their reproduction through increasingly insecure, oppressive, 
and scarce wage employment and/or a range of precarious small 
scale and “informal economy” survival activities, including 
marginal farming. Peasant livelihoods strategies remain a 
central part of twenty-first century global capitalism, both 
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as means of survival, and as ammunition for new forms of 
resistance. 
